Australia's Container Deposit Schemes
This briefing identifies potential legal, regulatory, and strategic issues arising from the operation, governance, and financial structure of Australia's container deposit schemes — with focus on the role of major beverage manufacturers in scheme design and governance across NSW, QLD, WA, VIC, and TAS, the treatment of unredeemed 10¢ deposits, the use of surplus scheme funds to offset beverage industry costs, and the legal status of refunds generated through kerbside recycling and MRFs.
~4B
Containers to litter/landfill annually
~$400M
Annual unclaimed consumer deposits
5 States
Coordinators controlled by Coca-Cola & Lion
10
CCC corruption referrals (QLD alone)
The Request & Strategic Position
We are seeking Shine Lawyers to assess this matter on a no win, no fee basis — as a potential multi-state class action or representative proceeding. The overall claim is multi-billion. We are seeking a fast settlement of $300M–$400M — the annual unclaimed consumer refund pool across NSW, QLD, WA, VIC and TAS.
What We Built
The Behaviour Change Experiment / The 10c Recycling Games — Australia's largest behavioural experiment EVER conducted. A behaviour-change platform where consumers who return containers opt in to direct their 10c refund into an Incentive Pool — funding community causes and return incentives — instead of taking it as cash. The pool is further grown by unclaimed and refused deposits. Critically, the model does not depend on unclaimed deposits: even if every container is returned and claimed, the opt-in stream still funds the pool. Using existing coordinator powers. No legislative change required.
The Rejection
We were verbally approved by WARRRL (WA's scheme coordinator) to operate as a third-party program. Then rejected in writing. Their reason: use their own strategy instead. WARRRL's own strategy has increased return rates by a projected 0.4%. WARRRL has been stalled around 65% for 3 years. They are 3 years past their strategic plan's projected target of 85%. They still have zero clear way of reaching it. The same coordinator that controls the surplus we proposed to redirect.
The Movement
This is not a fringe complaint. It is a nationally coordinated effort backed by parliamentary inquiry findings and 10 CCC corruption referrals in QLD alone. Whether the same conduct occurred in other states is a matter for investigation, given the shared governance structure across all coordinators.
Two Financial Streams Diverted — National Scope Since December 2017
Stream 1 — Unclaimed 10c deposits: Since NSW opened in December 2017, followed by QLD (2018), WA (2020), VIC (2023) and TAS (2025), consumers have paid 10c on every eligible beverage. When containers are not returned, those deposits become unclaimed. The national annual pool is $300M–$400M. Cumulatively since 2017, this is multi-billion.
Stream 2 — The scheme fee pass-through: Consumers also pay embedded scheme fees through product pricing — the cost of running the scheme, passed through to consumers by beverage manufacturers. When containers are not returned, expected service costs are never incurred. The resulting surplus is used to offset the very manufacturer costs that are passed back to consumers. The QLD Inquiry called this "shifting value from Queenslanders to themselves." The precise national totals — how much has been collected, where it went, and what it was used for — require forensic audit and discovery.
The MRF/kerbside issue: Who approved that MRF/kerbside collection can be counted as scheme participation? It is clearly not. The 10c does not belong to the MRF. Counting kerbside-recovered containers as 'scheme returns' inflates the reported return rate. The authority under which this arrangement was approved warrants investigation.
You pay two charges on every drink. One is refundable. One is not. Here is where each one ends up — and why it never reaches its purpose.
Refundable — if you return the container.
It is your money, held by the scheme until you reclaim it. Built into the shelf price at checkout.
Never refunded. Pays for running the scheme.
Covers refund points, trucks, sorting, processing, admin. Also built into the shelf price — you pay it regardless.
Comes back to you. Working as intended.
Spent on collecting & processing that container. Earned — fair use.
Net: the scheme works when you return.
Not returned to you. Becomes surplus.
No collection, no processing ever happened — but you paid for it. Also becomes surplus.
Combined surplus: ~$480M–$540M / year nationally
From
Consumer surplus
~$480M–$540M / yr
Used to reduce
manufacturer fees
To
Manufacturer
pays less into the scheme
Your drink price does not drop. The manufacturer remits less to the scheme, but keeps the difference — the consumer-funded surplus subsidises the companies that control the coordinator.
QLD Parliamentary Inquiry: "shifting value from Queenslanders to themselves"
Where It Goes
Manufacturer fee offset
The surplus subsidises the beverage companies who control the coordinator board. The same companies that pay less are the ones deciding where the surplus goes.
Where It Should Go
Fix the 85% return rate
The surplus exists BECAUSE the return rate is failing. The logical use is behavioural change — but it has never been directed at the problem it was created to solve.
13.3¢
You pay per drink (10¢ + ~3.3¢)
$400M+
Unclaimed 10¢ deposits retained / yr
7 / 8
States failing the 85% return target
~$2.5B+
Cumulative consumer loss since Dec 2017
The detailed forensic flow, legal theories, and source citations follow below.
How consumer-funded capital passes through the scheme, where it is diverted, and why the diversion is a statutory breach — traced dollar by dollar, branch by branch.
This map is the baseline. Every section of this briefing that follows — the governance map, the legal theories, the evidence catalog, the class action quantum — expands on a branch shown here. Counsel should read this first and refer back to it throughout.
The Sole Funder
Consumer Purchase
Total: 11.2c (VIC) to 19.5c (TAS) per container — e.g., 13.3c in QLD
100% of this is passed through to the consumer via higher beverage prices. The manufacturer is a collection agent, not a funder. KPMG (2020): 'The final cost burden of the CDS falls on consumers who purchase beverages.' The Guardian (2018): Coca-Cola and brewers 'passing on the cost.'
Pass-Through Collection Agent
Beverage Manufacturer
Collects consumer money, remits to coordinator — NOT the funder
The manufacturer is NOT the funder. The consumer is the funder. The manufacturer is the conduit. When the scheme says it is 'industry-funded,' that representation is false — the industry is collecting consumer money, not spending its own.
Conflict: The same manufacturers that pass through the cost also control the coordinators that decide what happens to the surplus. This is the structural conflict at the heart of the scheme.
Beverage-Controlled Repository
Scheme Coordinator
Beverage-controlled board — statutory office-holder
Statutory Duty
Advance the scheme's objects: reduce litter, increase resource recovery, reach 85% return rate. Reinvest surplus funds into activities that advance these objects — not into reducing manufacturer costs.
Actual Behavior
Retain surplus (unclaimed deposits + unearned service fees). Use surplus to offset future manufacturer contribution rates. The QLD Inquiry found: 'its major corporate members have used those reserves to offset theirs and other beverage manufacturer contribution rates — effectively shifting value from Queenslanders to themselves.'
The Three Disbursement Branches
Container not returned. The 10c deposit — consumer money held for reclamation — is retained by the coordinator. The consumer who paid it cannot reclaim it.
Container not returned. No refund point visit. No handling. No transport. No processing. Services NEVER RENDERED. The scheme fee — consumer money paid for services — is retained as surplus.
~$400M+ per year (national, growing as all states come online)
Unclaimed deposits / year
~$80M–$140M per year (national, estimated from per-state fee rates × unreturned container volumes)
Unearned fees / year
~$480M–$540M per year and growing
Total diverted / year
Legal Analysis: Two distinct consumer losses on every unreturned container: (1) the unclaimed 10c deposit, and (2) the unearned scheme fee — money paid for services that were never rendered. The scheme fee component is the stronger restitutionary claim: it is not a deposit the consumer 'forfeited' by not returning; it is payment for services that never occurred. This is a total failure of consideration.
Key Legal Gap
If the scheme fee was fully paid by the consumer at the time of purchase, but is not fully remitted by the manufacturer after the offset is calculated, then the manufacturer has retained consumer money that was intended to fund the scheme. The consumer paid for scheme operation. The manufacturer kept part of the payment. See: The Offset Mechanism below.
The Financial Hijack
The Offset Mechanism
The manufacturer's contribution is reduced. But the consumer's price is NOT reduced. The consumer continues to pay the full 13.3c. The manufacturer pockets the difference between what it collected from the consumer and what it actually remitted to the scheme.
QLD Inquiry Finding
"The QLD Parliamentary Inquiry found: 'its major corporate members have used those reserves to offset theirs and other beverage manufacturer contribution rates — effectively shifting value from Queenslanders to themselves.'"
⚠ The Pass-Through Gap — The Core Injustice
The scheme fee was passed through to the consumer at the time of purchase. The consumer fully paid it. After the offset, the manufacturer remits less to the scheme. But the consumer's price does not decrease. The manufacturer retains the difference. If the scheme fee was fully paid by the consumer but not fully remitted by the manufacturer after the offset, the manufacturer has retained consumer money that was intended to fund the scheme.
Is this retention authorized by legislation? If not, it may constitute unjust enrichment or conversion of consumer funds. The consumer paid for scheme operation. The manufacturer kept part of the payment.
⚠ The Double Payment Problem
Container 1: Consumer pays 13.3c. Not returned. The 3.3c scheme fee becomes surplus. Next period: the manufacturer's contribution is reduced by that surplus. Container 2: Consumer pays 13.3c (the full price — the manufacturer does not pass through the savings). The manufacturer remits less than 13.3c for Container 2. The consumer has effectively paid the scheme fee twice on the unreturned container: once as surplus, once as the 'reduced' contribution that was still charged at full price to the consumer.
Structural double-dipping built into the scheme's financial design. The consumer subsidizes the manufacturer on every unreturned container, then pays full price again on the next container.
Interest on Reserves
While the surplus sits in the coordinator's accounts, it may earn interest or investment returns. Where does that interest go? If it flows to the same offset mechanism (further reducing manufacturer fees) rather than to the scheme's statutory purpose, that is additional consumer-funded extraction. The QLD Inquiry found COEX held 'substantial retained earnings' — the investment treatment of those earnings requires forensic audit.
The Blocked Destination
The Statutory Purpose
Reduce litter, increase resource recovery, reach 85% return rate. This is where the surplus was meant to go — reinvested in return rate improvement, awareness, behavioural change, infrastructure, community participation.
7 of 8 states are BELOW the 85% legislated target. The surplus exists BECAUSE the purpose is failing — but the surplus is NOT directed at fixing the failure. Instead, it offsets manufacturer costs — the opposite of its statutory purpose.
| State | Return Rate | Target | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| NSW | 68% | 85% | 17% |
| QLD | 67% | 85% | 18% |
| WA | 65.6% | 85% | 20% |
| VIC | 62% | 85% | 23% |
| TAS | 52% | 85% | 33% |
The Paradox
The surplus is generated by the very behaviour the scheme is designed to eliminate (not returning containers). The logical use of that money would be to fund awareness and behavioural change programs. Not one Australian state has ever legislated that unclaimed deposits must be reinvested in return rate improvement. The resource to fix the problem exists — it has never been directed at the problem.
Each flow branch above gives rise to distinct legal theories. Expand each to see the analysis, Australian law caveats, and source citations.
Counsel will face these likely defences. Each has a counter that flows from the financial logic above.
Defence #1: The 'Forfeiture' Argument
Claim: The consumer forfeited the 10c deposit by choosing not to return the container. The scheme retains it legitimately.
Counter: Even if the 10c deposit is arguably forfeited (debatable — the consumer paid it, the statutory purpose was behavioural, the money is not a tax), the SCHEME FEE is a different matter. The scheme fee was paid for services — handling, transport, processing. On unreturned containers, no services were rendered. The scheme fee cannot be 'forfeited' because it was never a deposit — it was payment for services never performed. The scheme fee component is the stronger restitutionary claim.
Defence #2: The 'Fixed Capacity' Argument
Claim: The coordinator has fixed costs — depots, staff, transport contracts — that must be paid regardless of return volume. The scheme fee on unreturned containers covers fixed capacity.
Counter: Even if true, this does not explain why surplus offsets MANUFACTURER fees rather than being reinvested in return rate improvement. Fixed capacity costs would be part of projected scheme costs, not the surplus. If the surplus exceeds fixed capacity costs, the excess is unearned — and if it offsets manufacturer fees, it is a diversion from the statutory purpose.
Defence #3: The 'Legislation Permits It' Argument
Claim: The coordinator has broad discretion over surplus use under the legislation, so the offset is lawful.
Counter: Whether the legislation permits surplus funds to offset manufacturer costs is a matter of statutory construction. If the legislation gives broad discretion, the question is whether that discretion must be exercised consistently with the scheme's objects. The QLD Amendment Bill 2026 now requires a 'governance and investment plan' for surplus funds — implicitly acknowledging that prior surplus use lacked proper purpose alignment. If the legislation does NOT expressly authorize the offset, the diversion may be ultra vires.
To understand why this is actionable, you must first understand what the law says the money is for — and what the coordinator is required to do with it. The cards below set out the statutory definitions. The analysis beneath shows how coordinators are operating outside their authority.
Its Statutory Purpose Under Legislation
A refund amount of 10 cents, added to the price of every eligible beverage at the point of sale, payable to the person who returns the empty container to a collection point for recycling.
Legislated Definition — By State
Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act 2001 (NSW), Part 5
Establishes the container deposit scheme ('Return and Earn'). The 10c refund is the behavioural mechanism designed to reduce litter and increase resource recovery. The Scheme is a 'shared responsibility' model: industry funds, community returns, government regulates.
Waste Reduction and Recycling Act 2011 (Qld), s 99H
Objects of the container refund scheme: (i) reduce litter and illegal dumping of waste or other material; and (ii) promote resource recovery and efficiency. The 10c refund is the statutory incentive to achieve these objects.
Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act 2007 (WA), s 47E
Objects: to increase recycling, reduce litter, and support the circular economy. 10c refund payable per eligible container returned.
Environment Protection Act 2017 (Vic), Part 6.4
Establishes CDS Vic. 10c refund as the behavioural incentive. Coordinator (VicReturn) and zone operators appointed by the Minister.
Key Statutory Principles
Statutory Duties Upon Appointment by the Minister
A not-for-profit entity appointed by the Minister (or EPA) to administer the scheme, collect and disburse funds, and advance the scheme's statutory objects. The coordinator is a statutory office-holder, not a private commercial enterprise.
Legislated Definition — By State
WARR Act 2001, Part 5; Scheme Coordinator contract with EPA
Exchange for Change (EfC) appointed under contract with the NSW EPA. Incentivised to minimise overall scheme costs while advancing the objects. Separate from the Network Operator (TOMRA Cleanaway).
WRRA 2011, ss 99N–99P; Conditions of appointment
COEX appointed by the Minister as a 'fused' coordinator+operator. The QLD Inquiry found COEX was appointed 'without an open tender process.' Conditions of appointment require advancing the objects in s 99H.
WARR Act 2007, ss 47E–47G
WARRRL appointed as the 'fused' coordinator. Objects: increase recycling, reduce litter. Board includes beverage industry representatives.
EP Act 2017, Part 6.4
VicReturn appointed by the Minister. Scheme launched Nov 2023. Coordinator manages funds, MRF refund protocols, and scheme compliance.
Key Statutory Duties
The surplus had a statutory purpose. It is being diverted to offset the costs of the companies that control the coordinator. This is happening in every state — not just QLD.
Stream 1 — Unclaimed 10c Deposits (Since December 2017)
Since NSW opened in December 2017, followed by QLD (Nov 2018), WA (Oct 2020), VIC (Nov 2023) and TAS (May 2025), consumers have paid 10c on every eligible beverage purchased. When containers are not returned, those deposits become unclaimed. The national annual unclaimed pool is $300M–$400M. Cumulatively since 2017, this is multi-billion. Not one Australian state has ever legislated that unclaimed deposits must be reinvested in return rate improvement.
Stream 2 — The Scheme Fee Pass-Through Surplus
Consumers also pay embedded scheme fees through product pricing — the cost of running the scheme (refund points, handling, logistics, administration, processing, coordination), passed through to consumers by beverage manufacturers. When containers are not returned, expected service costs are never incurred. The resulting surplus is used to offset beverage manufacturer contribution rates. The QLD Inquiry found this constitutes 'shifting value from Queenslanders to themselves.' The same structure exists in every state. The precise national totals — how much has been collected, where it went, and what it was used for — require forensic audit and discovery.
What We Will Find Out
Since NSW opened in December 2017, consumers across NSW, QLD, WA, VIC and TAS have paid 10c deposits on every eligible beverage. When containers are not returned, those deposits become unclaimed. The national annual unclaimed pool is $300M–$400M. Cumulatively since 2017, this is multi-billion. The QLD Parliamentary Inquiry confirmed that in QLD alone, of $2.5B in revenue since inception, less than 40% was returned to consumers through refunds and less than 2% to charities. The same pattern — surplus retention, low return rates, no reinvestment mandate — exists in every state.
Source: QLD Inquiry Report — Chair's Foreword; state annual reports; Reloop Global Deposit Book 2024
Calculating the total consumer loss across all states since December 2017 — unclaimed deposits PLUS unneeded scheme fees on containers that never entered the return pathway
Varies by state — from ~11.2c (VIC) to ~19.5c (TAS) per container. QLD is 13.3c. This is what beverage manufacturers pay to the coordinator for every container sold, ultimately passed through to consumers via higher beverage prices (KPMG 2020; The Guardian 2018).
10c refund
Paid back to consumers who return containers. When containers are not returned, this becomes unclaimed surplus — currently ~$400M/year nationally.
State-specific scheme fee
Covers refund point network operation, transport, processing, administration, coordination. Ranges from ~1.2c (VIC) to ~9.5c (TAS) per container. When containers are not returned, the variable service costs (handling, transport, processing) are NEVER INCURRED for those containers — this portion also becomes surplus.
Per-State Contribution Rates (excl. GST)
| State | Coordinator | Rate | Refund | Fee | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NSW | Exchange for Change | 12.68c | 10c | ~2.68c | excl. GST — weighted average |
| QLD | COEX | 13.3c | 10c | ~3.3c | excl. GST — weighted average |
| WA | WARRRL | ~12.8c | 10c | ~2.8c | average (GST basis to confirm) |
| VIC | VicReturn | ~11.2c | 10c | ~1.2c | excl. GST — material-specific 11.05–11.50c |
| TAS | TasRecycle | ~19.5c | 10c | ~9.5c | excl. GST — early-stage (launched May 2025) |
If Returned
Net loss per returned container equals the state-specific scheme fee (e.g., 3.3c in QLD, 1.2c in VIC, 9.5c in TAS) — the consumer paid the full contribution and got 10c back.
If NOT Returned
Total loss per unreturned container equals the full state-specific contribution rate (e.g., 13.3c in QLD, 11.2c in VIC, ~19.5c in TAS) — the consumer paid the full amount and got 0c back.
The Hidden Second Stream
For every unreturned container, the consumer loses the FULL state-specific contribution — not just the 10c deposit. The scheme fee component (1.2c–9.5c per state) was collected for services that were never rendered (no refund point visit, no handling, no transport, no recycling processing). This is the hidden second stream of consumer loss, and it varies materially by state.
~$400M/year (4B × 10c) — the visible loss: unclaimed 10c deposits
Unclaimed 10c deposits — the visible loss (4B containers × 10c)
~$80M–$140M/year (national) — the hidden loss: scheme fees collected for services never rendered. Calculated using each state's actual fee component (1.2c–9.5c) applied to its share of unreturned containers. The earlier QLD-rate-derived estimate of $132M/year falls within this range; the precise figure requires forensic audit of per-state unreturned container volumes.
Unneeded scheme fees — the hidden loss (4B × 3.3c): fees for services never rendered
~$480M–$540M/year and growing as all states come online
Total annual consumer loss — and growing as all states come online
Key Question for Discovery
Was the scheme fee surplus on unreturned containers ALSO used to offset beverage manufacturer contribution rates — in addition to the unclaimed deposit surplus? If so, the beverage industry benefited from BOTH streams of consumer money, not just one. This must be established per-state through discovery.
| State | Launched | Years Running | Rate | Annual Estimate | Cumulative |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NSW | Dec 2017 | ~8.5 | 12.68c | ~$95M+ | ~$810M+ |
| QLD | Nov 2018 | ~7.5 | 13.3c | ~$148M+ | ~$1.1B+ |
| WA | Oct 2020 | ~5.5 | ~12.8c | ~$49M+ | ~$270M+ |
| VIC | Nov 2023 | ~2.5 | ~11.2c | ~$128M+ | ~$320M+ |
| TAS | May 2025 | ~1 | ~19.5c | ~$9M+ | ~$9M+ |
| TOTAL CUMULATIVE: | ~$2.5B+ (indicative) in combined unclaimed deposits and unneeded scheme fees since December 2017 | ||||
Each state's annual and cumulative estimate now uses that state's actual published contribution rate (shown in the Rate column) rather than the QLD rate applied nationally. Figures are indicative — they assume each state's unreturned-container share of the national ~4B total and reported return rates (which may be inflated by MRF/kerbside counting). Actual figures require forensic audit and discovery. The true figure may be HIGHER if: (a) return rates are lower than reported due to MRF inflation, (b) additional offsets were applied from the unclaimed pool, or (c) TAS's early-stage high fee persists as volume scales.
Fast Settlement
$300M–$400M — one year's unclaimed consumer refund pool across all states
One year's unclaimed consumer refund pool — to do what they refuse to do
Full Claim (Litigation)
Multi-billion — all unclaimed deposits + unneeded scheme fees since December 2017, across all five states, plus potential penalties and interest
All unclaimed deposits + unneeded scheme fees since Dec 2017
We are seeking a fast settlement of the annual unclaimed refund pool ($300M–$400M) redirected into a ring-fenced Incentive Pool. The pool is funded primarily by consumers who opt in to direct their 10c refund into it rather than take it as cash, and further grown by unclaimed and refused deposits — so it sustains the return rate the coordinators have refused to fix regardless of how high return rates climb. The full claim is multi-billion if the matter proceeds to litigation.
In 2013, Coca-Cola, Lion, and Schweppes won a Federal Court ruling that shut down the Northern Territory's container deposit scheme. By 2025, the same companies — Coca-Cola (now Coca-Cola Europacific Partners), Lion, and Asahi — had established or control the scheme coordinator in NSW, QLD, WA, VIC, and TAS. They also built the payment processing infrastructure (Circular Economy Systems) that handles the money.
Coordinator
Exchange for Change (EfC)
Established By
Coca-Cola Amatil, Lion, Asahi, CUB, Coopers — a beverage industry joint venture
Board Control
100% beverage industry. No independent directors at establishment.
CES Contract (Coke/Lion JV payment system)
Yes — CES powers transaction processing for EfC (confirmed: 4 major scheme launches)
Unclaimed Consumer Deposits (Annual)
~$55.1M
Scheme Retained — completely unclaimed (litter/landfill)
~$42M (FY22-23)
MRF/Council Captured — claimed, not by consumers
NSW EPA MRF Processing Protocol allows 23 MRFs to claim 10c refunds on kerbside-collected containers (by weight or direct count). EfC Annual Statutory Report 2022-23 confirms $42M paid to MRFs in that year alone. These refunds appear as 'claimed' but were never redeemed by consumers. True annual consumer loss ≈ $55.1M + $42M = ~$97M.
Coordinator
Container Exchange (COEX)
Established By
Unsolicited proposal from beverage companies. No open tender. Board dominated by Coca-Cola and Lion directors.
Board Control
Beverage majority. Parliamentary inquiry found board 'dominated by Coca-Cola and Lion.' Constitution required beverage companies to hold majority of board positions.
CES Contract (Coke/Lion JV payment system)
Yes — $96M contract to Circular Economy Systems (Coca-Cola/Lion JV). Inquiry found 'potential unlawful conduct.'
Unclaimed Consumer Deposits (Annual)
~$59.0M
Scheme Retained — completely unclaimed (litter/landfill)
~$20M/yr ($170M cum.)
MRF/Council Captured — claimed, not by consumers
COEX Annual Report 2022-23: 200M+ containers recovered through MRFs (~$20M/yr). Lion's submission to the QLD Parliamentary Inquiry confirms $170M cumulative paid to MRF operators and councils over ~6 years. True annual consumer loss ≈ $59M + $20M = ~$79M.
Coordinator
WARRRL (WA Return Recycle Renew Ltd)
Established By
Reloop Global Deposit Book 2024 documents: 'not-for-profit organisation established by Coca Cola Amatil and Lion Pty Ltd.'
Board Control
Beverage-established. Board includes former Coca-Cola Europacific Partners senior executives.
CES Contract (Coke/Lion JV payment system)
Yes — CES confirmed (powered 4 major scheme launches including WA, per CES About page)
Unclaimed Consumer Deposits (Annual)
~$44.0M
Scheme Retained — completely unclaimed (litter/landfill)
~$7M/yr (est.)
MRF/Council Captured — claimed, not by consumers
WARRRL does not separately disclose MRF refund amounts in public annual reports. Reloop reports ~10.6% of returned containers nationally are recovered through MRFs — applied to WA's ~721M returned containers, this estimates ~$7M/yr captured by MRFs/councils. Exact figure requires RTI investigation. True consumer loss ≈ $44M + $7M = ~$51M.
Coordinator
VicReturn
Established By
VicReturn's own website: 'formed by Lion Pty Ltd, Coca-Cola Europacific Partners and Asahi Beverages to bid to become the Scheme Co-ordinator.'
Board Control
Board representatives from the three beverage companies + independent chair.
CES Contract (Coke/Lion JV payment system)
Yes — CES confirmed (powered 4 major scheme launches including VIC, per CES About page)
Unclaimed Consumer Deposits (Annual)
~$96M
Scheme Retained — completely unclaimed (litter/landfill)
~$37M (8 mo. FY23-24)
MRF/Council Captured — claimed, not by consumers
Recycling Victoria Annual Report 2023-24: 372.2M containers returned through MRFs processing kerbside materials in first 8 months = ~$37M. Annualised ≈ $56M/yr. VicReturn confirms MRF operators claim processing refunds for kerbside containers. True annual consumer loss ≈ $96M + $56M = ~$152M.
Coordinator
TasRecycle
Established By
Premier of Tasmania: 'TasRecycle is a not-for-profit entity that was formed by Lion Pty Ltd, Coca-Cola Europacific Partners and Asahi Beverages.' Same three companies as VicReturn.
Board Control
Beverage industry formed and controls.
CES Contract (Coke/Lion JV payment system)
Probable — same three-company ownership pattern as VIC; CES has powered all 4 prior scheme launches (CES About page). TAS launched May 2025, after CES's 'first 7 years' claim.
Unclaimed Consumer Deposits (Annual)
~$6.34M
Scheme Retained — completely unclaimed (litter/landfill)
No data yet
MRF/Council Captured — claimed, not by consumers
TAS Recycle Rewards launched May 2025. MRF/kerbside refund arrangements likely follow the same pattern as other states (national avg ~10.6% via MRFs per Reloop). No MRF capture data available yet — requires monitoring of first annual report. True consumer loss cannot be fully assessed.
The Payment Infrastructure — Circular Economy Systems (CES)
Circular Economy Systems (CES) — initially formed in 2017 as "Container Exchange Services" and relaunched as CES in 2024 — is a joint venture between Coca-Cola and Lion. It provides the IT and payment processing platform for container deposit schemes. CES states it has "partnered 4 major scheme launches" in its first 7 years — NSW (2017), QLD (2018), WA (2020), and VIC (2023) — and has "powered transactions for more than 11 billion containers". The same Coca-Cola/Lion JV controls the payment infrastructure across all four schemes. TAS (launched May 2025) follows the same coordinator ownership pattern.
In Queensland, COEX awarded CES a $96 million contract — the QLD Parliamentary Inquiry found "potential unlawful conduct" in relation to this arrangement, as CES is owned by the same two companies (Coca-Cola and Lion) that dominated the COEX board.
A 13-year pattern: the beverage industry fought container deposit schemes in court, lost the political battle, then secured control of the coordinators in five states — and built the payment infrastructure that processes the money.
SA becomes the first Australian jurisdiction with a container deposit scheme. It operates for 35 years as the only scheme, achieving 79% return rate at peak. No beverage industry coordinator — SA EPA directly regulates.
SA EPA — Container deposit scheme historyCoca-Cola publicly opposes proposed container deposit schemes in the Northern Territory and Western Australia. Boomerang Alliance documents that Coca-Cola 'opposed proposals for the Northern Territory and Western Australia container deposit schemes in 2011 and 2013.'
Boomerang Alliance — We can't let big beverage contaminate VIC CDSNorthern Territory becomes the second Australian jurisdiction to implement a CDS. The scheme is modelled on SA's successful system.
Wikipedia — Container deposit schemes in AustraliaA 'cartel composed of Coca-Cola Amatil, Schweppes and Lion' launches Federal Court action against the NT scheme, arguing it breaches the Commonwealth Mutual Recognition Act 1992 — which guarantees products can be sold across state borders without special labelling requirements.
FoodNavigator Asia — NT scheme moves to courtThe Federal Court rules the NT container deposit scheme is illegal under Commonwealth law. The scheme CEASES. Coca-Cola 'wins the right to dismantle a Northern Territory recycling scheme.' Public backlash is severe — consumers and environmental groups are outraged.
ABC News — Federal Court cans NT deposit schemeThe NT Government obtains a permanent exemption from the Mutual Recognition framework. The scheme is REINSTATED, forcing beverage companies to resume paying deposits on eligible containers. The Boomerang Alliance documents that the scheme was 'reinstated, forcing the beverage companies to resume the repayment of deposits.'
Boomerang Alliance — Cash for Containers NTThe beverage industry 'strongly opposed' the NSW scheme before its introduction. The Boomerang Alliance runs a multi-year campaign. UTS documents that 'intense lobbying by the beverage industry' nearly killed the legislation. The industry uses 'heavy duty tactics to lobby the government, developing misleading adverts, taking legal action, commissioning questionable studies and even threatening politicians at election time.'
UTS — NSW container deposit legislation a crushing storyAfter years of campaigning by the Boomerang Alliance and Total Environment Centre, the NSW Premier announces introduction of a full container deposit scheme. This is the historic turning point — the beverage industry's opposition fails in the most populous state.
Purves Environmental Fund — CDS CampaignCoca-Cola Amatil, Asahi, CUB, Coopers and Lion form a joint venture — Exchange for Change — which is appointed as the NSW scheme coordinator. The same companies that fought the scheme now control it. AFR reports: 'Coca-Cola Amatil and rivals will oversee the introduction of a container deposit scheme in NSW.'
AFR — Coca-Cola Amatil wins role in container deposit schemeCircular Economy Systems (CES), initially formed as 'Container Exchange Services' in 2017 and relaunched as CES in 2024, is a joint venture between Coca-Cola and Lion. It builds the IT and payment processing platform for container deposit schemes. CES has 'powered transactions for more than 11 billion containers' — controlling the financial plumbing of the schemes.
Circular Economy Systems — AboutNSW scheme launches with Exchange for Change (beverage JV) as coordinator. The Guardian confirms: 'Coca-Cola Amatil, Asahi, CUB, Coopers and Lion formed a joint venture, named Exchange for Change, which plays a role in overseeing the scheme.' Costs are passed through to consumers.
The Guardian — Coca-Cola and brewers passing on cost (2018)COEX is appointed without open tender via an 'unsolicited proposal' from beverage companies. The parliamentary inquiry later finds: the board is 'dominated by Coca-Cola and Lion,' the constitution required beverage companies to hold majority of board positions, and a $96M contract was awarded to CES (Coca-Cola/Lion JV) — with the inquiry finding 'potential unlawful conduct.'
QLD Parliamentary Inquiry Report (Oct 2025) — PDFWARRRL is appointed as WA coordinator. The Reloop Global Deposit Book 2024 documents that WARRRL is a 'not-for-profit organisation established by Coca Cola Amatil and Lion Pty Ltd.' WARRRL's board includes former Coca-Cola Europacific Partners senior executives.
Reloop Global Deposit Book 2024 (PDF)As Victoria and Tasmania move to implement CDS, the Boomerang Alliance warns that 'Coke and Lion have been pouring money into a campaign to get the design they want.' They document that the QLD model lets 'beverage companies get to keep unredeemed consumer refunds increasing their profits.' A Change.org petition gathers 51,000+ signatures.
Boomerang Alliance — Coke up to its old tricks (Mar 2021)VicReturn is appointed as VIC coordinator. Its own website states it was 'formed by Lion Pty Ltd, Coca-Cola Europacific Partners and Asahi Beverages.' The same three-company pattern that would later appear in Tasmania.
VicReturn — Who We AreTasRecycle is appointed as TAS coordinator. The Premier of Tasmania confirms: 'TasRecycle is a not-for-profit entity that was formed by Lion Pty Ltd, Coca-Cola Europacific Partners and Asahi Beverages.' Identical ownership structure to VicReturn. Packaging News headlines: 'Beverage giants to run Tasmania's new CDS.'
Premier of Tasmania — Recycle Rewards appointment (2024)The Health, Environment and Innovation Committee tables its report. Findings: board 'dominated by Coca-Cola and Lion'; $96M contract to CES (Coke/Lion JV) with 'potential unlawful conduct'; COEX appointed without open tender; whistleblowers describe bullying; 30 of 120 submissions requested anonymity; 10 allegations referred to the Crime and Corruption Commission; only 36% of revenue returned to consumers; surpluses used to offset manufacturer costs.
QLD Parliamentary Inquiry Report (Oct 2025) — PDFThe Crisafulli Government tables its response and introduces the Waste Reduction and Recycling (Strengthening the Container Refund Scheme) Amendment Bill 2026. The bill requires majority independent directors, Minister-approved appointments, a governance and investment plan for surplus funds, and clarifies COEX is a 'unit of public administration' under the Crime and Corruption Act. This confirms the governance failures were real.
QLD Government — Improving the container refund schemeIf all scheme costs are passed through to consumers, why does the beverage industry claim it is 'disincentivised' to increase return rates?
The Claim Heard by the QLD Inquiry
The QLD Parliamentary Inquiry heard claims that beverage industry board members who control the coordinator are 'disincentivised' to have more containers returned because 'it costs them money.'
QLD Parliamentary Inquiry Report (Oct 2025)
The Paradox
The Question
If beverage manufacturers pass 100% of scheme costs (13.3c per container) through to consumers via higher prices — as The Guardian confirmed in 2018 and KPMG confirmed in 2020 — then what does it cost them when more containers are returned?
The Answer
Nothing. The consumer already paid the 13.3c. The manufacturer collected it and passed it to the coordinator. When a container is returned, the coordinator pays 10c back to the consumer from the pool. The manufacturer's net cost is zero — they were just the collection agent.
The Real Reason
The real 'disincentive' is not about the cost of returns. It is about the SURPLUS from non-returns. When fewer containers are returned, more surplus accumulates. The QLD Inquiry found that surplus is used to 'offset beverage manufacturer contribution rates.' So: FEWER returns = MORE surplus = LOWER future manufacturer costs = HIGHER manufacturer profits. The beverage industry does not lose money from higher return rates — they lose the surplus that reduces their costs.
The Structural Conflict
This is a direct conflict of interest with the statutory purpose. The scheme exists to INCREASE return rates (to 85%). But the companies that control the coordinator FINANCIALLY BENEFIT from LOW return rates — because low returns generate the surplus that offsets their costs. The coordinator's statutory duty is to advance the scheme's objects (increase recycling, reduce litter, reach 85%). The beverage industry's financial interest is the opposite. The same companies sit on both sides of this conflict — as statutory duty-holders AND as financial beneficiaries of scheme failure.
Why This Is More Than a Conflict
This is not just a conflict of interest. It is a structural incentive to breach statutory duty. If the coordinator acts in the beverage industry's financial interest (keeping return rates low to preserve surplus), it is simultaneously failing its statutory duty to increase return rates. The governance structure creates a built-in incentive to breach the law.
Questions for Examination
Each theory below includes the supporting facts, the relevant Australian legal test (with caveats), the evidence gaps that need to be filled, and the specific questions counsel should assess. Click to expand.
Supporting Facts
Australian Law Caveat
Unjust enrichment is NOT recognised as a standalone cause of action in Australia. The High Court and Federal Court have confirmed this repeatedly (David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1993) 176 CLR 328; Roxborough v Top Energy (2001)). It must be pleaded through existing restitutionary causes of action — typically 'money had and received' or 'total failure of consideration.' Counsel must assess whether a viable pleading exists under Australian restitution law.
Evidence Required
Questions for Counsel
The 10c refund is the visible behavioural incentive. The additional scheme fee is the less visible issue. If the consumer pays both through product pricing, both should remain tied to the statutory and behavioural purpose of the scheme.
The 10c Refund
The visible behavioural incentive
Exists to influence behaviour — encourage consumers to return containers and keep material out of landfill.
Concern
When containers are not returned, the 10c is not paid to the consumer. This is the visible, well-understood gap.
The Scheme Fee
The less visible issue
Exists to fund the machinery of the scheme — refund points, handling, logistics, administration, processing, coordination.
Concern
Consumers may also be paying embedded scheme fees on containers that never enter the refund pathway. Some expected service costs may never be incurred, while the resulting surplus may reduce future industry costs.
Most Precise Characterisation
Consumer-funded scheme-fee over-recovery being used as an industry cost offset.
The key concern is not only that consumers fail to redeem the 10c. The deeper concern is that consumers may also be paying embedded scheme fees on containers that never enter the refund pathway, meaning some expected service costs may never be incurred, while the resulting surplus may reduce future industry costs.
A separate legal issue: eligible containers placed by consumers into ordinary council recycling bins
Core Legal Question
How was it built into legislation or scheme rules that a material recovery facility, council, contractor or processor can claim the 10c refund on eligible containers recovered through kerbside recycling?
Legal Theory
Once a consumer discards the container into the kerbside recycling system, the container enters a waste/recycling stream where another party may lawfully possess, sort, aggregate and present the container for refund.
Policy Issue
The consumer originally paid for the refund value. If the consumer places the container in the recycling bin instead of a refund point, should the 10c be treated as forfeited to the recycling system, or should there be a mechanism to return value to that consumer, their household, their council area, or a public-purpose participation fund?
Questions for Legal Investigation
Policy Argument
If a consumer-paid 10c refund is captured through kerbside recycling, it should either be returned to the consumer through a verified loyalty/account system, reduce council waste charges, be allocated to community/environmental funds, or be used to increase scheme participation and recovery rates. It should not disappear into opaque operational revenue without public accountability.
Questions for Counsel
Whether the statutory scheme unlawfully or unfairly permits private capture of refund value from kerbside recycling.
Whether MRF or council retention of 10c refunds from kerbside containers is lawful, transparent and consistent with consumer expectations.
Whether a loyalty-based return mechanism could return or reallocate value to consumers on subsequent purchases.
Evidence Sources — MRF/Kerbside Refund Protocols
Consumers pay 13.3c extra per beverage (10c deposit + ~3.3c scheme fee, passed through by manufacturers). When they return a container, they get 10c back. They cannot 'earn' money they already paid. They cannot be 'rewarded' with their own deposit. The net position for every returned container is a 3.3c LOSS. For every unreturned container, the loss is the full 13.3c. There is no earning. There is no reward. It is a deposit and a refund at a loss.
Return and Earn
'Earn' implies gaining money. Consumers pay 13.3c and get 10c back — a net loss of 3.3c per container. You cannot 'earn' your own money back at a loss.
Recycle Rewards
'Rewards' implies a bonus or gift. The 10c is not a reward — it is the consumer's own deposit, refunded at a net loss of 3.3c per container.
Containers for Change
Less overtly misleading, but still implies the consumer is 'changing' something for the better — when they are losing money on every container.
CDS Vic
Neutral naming, but marketing still uses 'earn 10c' language that implies gaining rather than refunding.
Marketing consistently uses 'earn 10c' phrasing — implying the consumer is gaining something. In reality, they paid 13.3c and are getting 10c back. This is a partial refund of their own money, not earnings.
Legal Relevance
Under Australian Consumer Law s18 (misleading or deceptive conduct) and s29 (false or misleading representations), representing a partial refund of the consumer's own money as 'earning' may create a misleading impression about the nature of the transaction.
The MRF Connection: Why they need to inflate return rates
If the scheme is marketed as 'Return and Earn' but consumers are actually losing money, the scheme needs to appear successful to maintain political and public support. Counting MRF/kerbside-recovered containers as 'scheme returns' inflates the reported return rate — making a failing scheme (65–68% vs the 85% target) appear closer to success than it is. This is not just a technical accounting issue. It is a marketing necessity: the inflated numbers sustain the 'Earn' and 'Rewards' narrative. Without MRF inflation, the true scheme-only return rate would be even lower, and the gap between the marketing and the reality would be even more visible. This arrangement is open to question on the basis of the QLD Parliamentary Inquiry, which found the scheme is failing its statutory purpose while presenting an image of success.
Board dominated by Coca-Cola and Lion
$96M contract to CES (Coca-Cola/Lion JV) — 'potential unlawful conduct'
Substantial retained earnings with 'no clear policy' for environmental/charitable use
COEX appointed without open tender — 'without waste industry representation'
10 allegations referred to Crime and Corruption Commission
U Can Recycle vs COEX — $5M Federal Court dispute
NSW: $149,000 fine for double-counting 3M containers (Grafton)
Legislative silence: 0 of 8 states require unclaimed deposit disclosure or reinvestment
Exchange for Change — JV of Coca-Cola, Lion, Asahi, CUB, Coopers (NSW/ACT)
VicReturn — 'formed by Lion, Coca-Cola Europacific Partners and Asahi Beverages' (VIC)
TasRecycle — 'formed by Lion, Coca-Cola Europacific Partners and Asahi Beverages' (TAS)
WARRRL — 'established by Coca Cola Amatil and Lion Pty Ltd' (WA)
CES — Coca-Cola/Lion JV providing payment infrastructure, 11B+ containers processed
Coca-Cola, Lion, Schweppes shut down NT scheme via Federal Court (Mutual Recognition Act)
Coca-Cola and brewers 'passing on cost' of CDS to consumers
Boomerang Alliance: 'beverage companies get to keep unredeemed consumer refunds increasing their profits'
QLD Amendment Bill 2026 — requires majority independent directors, surplus investment plan
Boomerang Alliance: Coke and Lion used 'heavy duty tactics' — misleading adverts, legal action, threatening politicians
7News whistleblower: 'each and every time I am most definitely short changed'
NEPC RIS acknowledges 'price impact of unredeemed deposit' — but no federal disclosure requirement
This is a compilation of publicly available information from third-party sources. The 10c Recycling Games is not the originator of any information presented. All items are linked to their original published source.
~4 billion
Containers to litter/landfill annually
~$400M
Annual unclaimed consumer deposits (minimum)
7 of 8
States below the 85% legislated target
18%
National gap to the 85% target
The Statutory Duty Argument
The 10¢ container deposit is behavioural-purpose money by statutory design. Every CDS Act in Australia states environmental and behavioural purposes: reduce litter, increase recycling, achieve return rate targets. The 10¢ exists to influence consumer behaviour — to encourage people to return containers and keep material out of landfill.
Coordinators have a statutory duty to reach 85% return rates. Every coordinator is legally required to progress toward 85%. 7 of 8 are in statutory non-compliance.
The resource to fix the problem exists but has never been directed at the problem. The 10¢ container deposit is behavioural-purpose money by statutory design. Unclaimed deposits represent hundreds of millions of dollars generated by the very behaviour — not returning containers — that schemes are designed to eliminate. The logical use of that money would be to fund awareness and behavioural change programs. Not one Australian state has ever legislated that requirement.
Consumer-funded surplus should be ring-fenced for return-rate improvement, consumer value return, community benefit, and verified recycling participation — not absorbed as an industry cost offset.
We seek a comprehensive investigation into the operation, governance, and financial structure of Australia's container deposit schemes across all five states. The investigation should determine whether scheme coordinators have been acting as fiduciaries of the beverage industry rather than as statutory office-holders serving the public purpose for which they were appointed.
A forensic accounting audit of all scheme coordinators (EfC, COEX, WARRRL, VicReturn, TasRecycle) to trace the full flow of consumer-funded money: from manufacturer contribution collection, through refund disbursement, operational expenditure, surplus allocation, and manufacturer contribution rate offsetting.
Queensland uses Right to Information (RTI) processes. Equivalent information access laws exist in NSW (GIPA Act), WA (FOI Act), VIC (FOI Act), and TAS (RTI Act). The following categories should be targeted across all five states.
Scheme Establishment Documents
RTI / FOI Targets
Documents to Seek
Coordinator Governance Documents
RTI / FOI Targets
Documents to Seek
Financial Documents
RTI / FOI Targets
Documents to Seek
Pricing & Pass-Through Documents
RTI / FOI Targets
Documents to Seek
Kerbside / MRF Documents
RTI / FOI Targets
Documents to Seek
CES / Payment Infrastructure Documents
RTI / FOI Targets
Documents to Seek
Potential Regulatory Complaint Pathways
• Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) — follow-up to existing 10 referrals
• ACCC — Australian Consumer Law (misleading conduct, competition)
• ASIC — directors' duties and related-party transactions
• ACNC — if coordinator entities hold charity status
• State Offices of Fair Trading / Consumer Affairs
• State Ombudsmen — administrative conduct
• State Auditors-General — public fund use
• Parliamentary committees — each state
Shine Lawyers operates class actions on a no out-of-pocket costs model — fees are deducted from any settlement approved by the Court, with no cost to group members if the action is unsuccessful. We are asking Shine to assess whether this matter meets the class action criteria: 7+ people with claims against the same defendants, relating to the same or similar circumstances, with at least one common issue of law or fact.
Identifiable class: every Australian consumer who purchased an eligible beverage container and paid the embedded 10¢ deposit + scheme fee
Common defendants: beverage manufacturers (Coca-Cola, Lion, Asahi) and scheme coordinators (COEX, EfC, WARRRL, VicReturn, TasRecycle) across 5 states
Common issues: unjust enrichment via surplus retention, misleading 'industry-funded' representations, structural conflict of interest, misuse of purpose-bound funds
Environmental harm frame: 4 billion containers to litter/landfill annually when the resources exist to prevent it
Strategic Position — The Behavioural Reinvestment Solution
The 10c Recycling Games is positioned as the missing behavioural layer — not a competitor to existing infrastructure, but the engagement mechanism that coordinators need to satisfy their statutory duty and reach 85% return rates.
The strategic proposal: create a ring-fenced Incentive Pool (the Behavioural Recycling Participation Fund) funded primarily by voluntary opt-in — consumers who return a container choose to direct their 10c refund into the Incentive Pool rather than take it as cash — and further grown by unclaimed and refused deposit value (the surplus currently used to offset manufacturer costs), over-recovered scheme fees, voluntary manufacturer contributions, government grants, and brand funding. The model does not depend on unclaimed deposits: even at 85%+ return rates, the opt-in stream still funds the pool.
The opt-in mechanism is the behavioural engine: every consumer who directs their refund into the Incentive Pool grows the fund that drives more returns — a self-reinforcing loop the coordinators have never built.
This gives coordinators and beverage manufacturers a lawful, reputationally positive pathway out of a conflicted structure — converting surplus controversy into public benefit, improving return-rate performance, and reducing legal and reputational risk.
Review the six legal theories and assess which have viable causes of action under Australian law
Assess whether unjust enrichment can be pleaded through restitutionary causes of action (money had and received, total failure of consideration)
Assess the misleading conduct claim under ACL s18/s29 — were 'industry-funded' representations made in trade or commerce?
Map the class: consumer purchasers of eligible containers across NSW, QLD, WA, VIC, TAS
Lodge targeted RTI/FOI requests for scheme design, surplus policy, MRF refund treatment, and CES contract terms across all 5 states
Obtain coordinator governance documents (constitutions, board minutes, related-party registers) from ASIC/ACNC
Prepare parallel complaints to CCC, ACCC, state Ombudsmen, and Auditors-General once documents are obtained
Disclaimer: This briefing document is not legal advice. It is a compilation of publicly available information and legal theories prepared for assessment by qualified legal counsel. All claims are sourced and linked to their original published sources. The 10c Recycling Games is not the originator of any third-party information presented. Some items reference ongoing legal proceedings and unproven allegations — these are included because they are part of the public record and relevant to the assessment. This document does not constitute a legal finding of wrongdoing by any named party.